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Aristotelian Explanation
GARETH B. MATTHEWS
Jaakko Hintikka's influential paper, "On the Ingredients of an Aris-
totelian Science,"' suggests an interesting experiment. We should
select a bright and promising graduate student in philosophy who
has never read any Aristotle. We should then give our student
Aristotle's Prior Analytics for close study, add a little extra coaching
on "the role of existential presuppositions in syllogistic premisses"
(55), drop the hint that "syllogisms are the universal tool of any
systematic science" {ibid.) and then ask our student to predict "the
ingredients of an Aristotelian science." If what Hintikka tells us in
his paper is right, we could reasonably expect from such a student a
moderately accurate sketch of the Posterior Analytics}
Clearly any student who followed those instructions and produced
the sketch of the Posterior Analytics Hintikka himself offers in his paper
would deserve an "A"; for Hintikka's result is indeed what the student
in our experiment should have projected. But do the constraints of
the experiment fit the real Aristotle? Does the outline of an Aristo-
telian science that emerges in the Posterior Analytics actually conform
to the Hintikka projection? I think the answer to both questions is
"No."
' Nous 6 (1972), 55-69. Simple page references refer to this article. Line references
are, of course, to Aristotle.
^ ".
. . Aristotle's syllogistic theory, together with his belief that syllogisms are
the universal tool of any systematic science, naturally led him to a specific view of
the ingredients of a science. One is almost tempted to say that Aristotle's views on
the first principles of a science are predictable on the basis of his syllogistic theory,
including his ideas of the role of existential presuppositions in syllogistic premisses"
(55).
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Hintikka is right to link the notion of demonstration in Aristotle
with that of explanation. Here there is an interesting parallel between
Aristotle and a modern proponent of the deductive-nomological
model of explanation, such as Carl G. Hempel. Just as for the modern
deductivist there is a certain symmetry between explanation and
prediction, so, for Aristotle, there is a symmetry between explanation
(giving the cause) and demonstration. On the modern deductivist's
view, to explain an event one must come up with a law, or lawlike
generalization, from which, together with appropriate initial condi-
tions, that event could have been predicted.^ What explains a given
phenomenon, on this view, is precisely what could have been used to
predict that the phenomenon would occur. On Aristotle's view, to
explain why every C is an A one must produce appropriate premises
from which that conclusion can be demonstrated. "Demonstration"
(aTTodei^Lq) Aristotle says, "is syllogism that can show the cause"
{deiKTiKoq aiTLaq) (85b22). So what explains the fact that p is, on this
view, precisely what can be used to demonstrate the fact that p.
What count as appropriate premises for demonstrating that every
C is an A, and hence for explaining why this is so? According to
Hintikka they are basically the universal, affirmative, categorical
propositions that link the species, C, to the genus. A, through the
mediation of some intermediate genus, B (57, 59).
There may, of course, be more than one intermediate genus, so
long as successive intermediates are nested in order of what they
encompass. Thus suppose the following propositions true:
Every C is a Bg.
Every B2 is a B,.
Every B, is an A.
Suppose further that the terms, "C," "B2," "B,," "A," constitute
what Solmsen has called an ''Eidoskette'';'* that is, suppose they are
nested in such a way that the comprehension of each (1) includes the
comprehension of all its predecessors but (2) is narrower than the
comprehension of each of its successors. The series, "isosceles,"
' Cf. Carl B. Hempel, Philosophy of Natural Science, (Englewood Cliffs, NJ 1966).
pp. 48-50.
''
"The syllogism originated out of "Eidosketten," i.e., ideas arranged along a chain
in the order of decreasing extension, their normal relation being that of genus,
species, inferior species, etc. Chains of this kind had been worked out and theorized
upon by Plato and his pupils in the Academy, in connection especially with their
favorite method, the diaeresis" (Friedrich Solmsen, "The Discovery of the Syllogism,"
Philosophical Reinew 50 [1941], 410).
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"triangle," "rectilinear," "(plane) figure," may serve as an example
of such a chain.
Now the question,
Why is every C an A?
can be given this answer:
Because every C is a B2 and every B2 is an A.
Or this answer:
Because every C is a B, and every B, is an A.
I shall call the concept of explanation illustrated by these answers
the "mediating concept of explanation." The intermediate genus
locates the species within the genus by mediation.
What can be said for the mediating concept of explanation? Well,
we sometimes put it to work. Suppose a library catalogued on the
Dewey decimal system has its 1 00s on the first floor and its 900s on
the third. To an expression of puzzlement that Ralph Barton Perry's
The Thought and Character of William James is on the third floor, not
on the first, the librarian might explain, "A book devoted to the life
of a single philosopher will be on the third floor, because it's
biography." Or again, to a pupil puzzled over how it is that whales
are warm-blooded creatures we might point out that whales are, after
all, mammals and, of course, mammals are warm-blooded creatures.
Hintikka tells us that Aristotle "reduces all syllogisms to those of
the first figure" (57) and that the alleged "superiority [of the first
figure] is somehow due to the fact that syllogisms in the first figure
turn directly on the transitivity of class-inclusion" (ibid.). "Accordingly,
he says, "Aristotelian explanation will operate by making class-
inclusions clear through [the] transitivity of this relation, that is, by
inserting intermediate terms between the ones whose connection is
to be explained" (ibid.). No doubt the story about the first figure and
its importance to Aristotle is really somewhat more complicated than
this. But we can at least agree on a main point: what Aristotle's
syllogistic prepares us for is the idea of constructing explanations by
the insertion of terms intermediate between the comprehensions of
the "ones whose connection is to be explained." That is what our
mythical "A" student should anticipate from a careful study of the
Prior Analytics— namely, an account of science based on the mediating
concept of explanation.
What we actually find in the Posterior Analytics is something quite
different. To be sure, certain passages do suggest that Aristotle has
the mediating concept of explanation in mind. Thus, for example,
Aristotle says at 84a36-37, in a passage Hintikka cites, "It is by
adding a term internally, not externally, that a proposition is dem-
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onstrated." Even more striking is the schematic example near the
end of B17 (99a30-99b3); it certainly seems to presuppose the
mediating concept.
Yet to conclude from passages like these that it is the mediating
concept of explanation that Aristotle wants to build science on would
be a mistake. In fact Aristotle makes a special point in the Posterior
Analytics of rejecting the mediating concept. One could say that his
reason for rejecting it is that the mediating concept assures us only
of a sufficient condition for C's being A's, whereas what Aristotle is
really after in science is something much, much stronger.
For convenience's sake let us suppose that all Aristotelian dem-
onstrations can be cast in the form of the Barbara syllogism:
Every B is an A.
Every C is a B.
Every C is an A.
Thus one asks, "Why is every C an A?" and the answer is, "Because
every C is a B and every B is an A."
What Aristotle does in the Posterior Analytics is to place stringent
conditions on what can function as middle and major terms in a
scientific demonstration, conditions unanticipated in the Prior Ana-
lytics, and to some extent out of keeping with that work. For one
thing, the attribute expressed by the major term must be essential,
or per se {Kad' avra— A4), to the subject expressed by the middle.
Much more surprising from the perspective of the Prior Analytics,
and hence much more interesting for present purposes, is the re-
quirement that the major term be (as Mure renders ''katholou" in
the Oxford translation of the Posterior Analytics) "commensurately
universal" with the middle. This requirement is introduced and
explained at A4-5, argued for in A24, and referred to here and
there pretty much throughout the Posterior Analytics.
What the English expression "commensurately universal" brings
out most clearly is the extensional force of the requirement that
Aristotle has in mind. That is, what it best suggests is simply that the
major and middle terms must be coextensive, that they must be
"reciprocals" {ra avTL<TTp((f)ovTa), as Aristotle sometimes puts it (78a27,
84a24).
The additional force of the requirement Aristotle is interested in
is perhaps better put by saying that, if it is really because of being
B's that C's are A's, then it must be qua B that a thing is A (73b27,
74a35, 75b36. etc.); or again, B must be the first subject of A (73b39,
74a 12, 74a38, etc.). I shall call this requirement the "first-subject
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requirement" and the concept of explanation to which it leads the
"first-subject concept of explanation." But I should add the warning
that typically in the Posterior Analytics Aristotle uses "'katholou' ("com-
mensurately universal") to introduce in its full force what I am calling
the "first-subject requirement."
An example may help make the concept clearer. At the end of
Posterior Analytics A5 Aristotle considers why the brazen isosceles is
a figure with interior angles adding up to two right angles, or, as we
might say more simply, a 180° figure. Using the mediating concept
of explanation we might come up with the answer that the brazen
isosceles is, after all, an isosceles, and every isosceles is a 180° figure.
But Aristotle rejects that. His complaint is that other things besides
the isosceles have angles adding up to 180°. Isosceles is not the first
subject of 180° figure; triangle is. Equivalently, it is not qua isosceles,
but qua triangle, that the brazen isosceles is a 180° figure. So to
demonstrate that the brazen isosceles is a 180° figure, or to explain
why this is so, it is not enough to link brazen isosceles to 180° figure
by means of the mediating term, isosceles. Mere mediation does not
demonstrate, or explain. One needs to find the first subject of 180°
figure, which, according to Aristotle, is triangle. Thus it is by being
a triangle, he thinks, that the brazen isosceles is made to be a 180°
figure.
It would be understating things to say that Aristotle's theory of
the syllogism does not prepare us for this first-subject requirement.
Consider just the coextensional import of the requirement alone. In
at least one passage in the Prior Analytics (46a39 f.) Aristotle insists
that, in an affirmative syllogistic demonstration, the major term will
always have a comprehension greater than that of the middle. What
this passage brings out is the great importance to Aristotle's conception
of the syllogism that the idea of an Eidoskette has. In fact, of course,
there is no good reason to limit the application of syllogistic reasoning
to arguments made up of nested terms of ever increasing compre-
hension. A Barbara syllogism with convertible major and middle
terms is best viewed as a special case of Barbara— no more and no
less valid than Barbaras made up of terms that yield a bona fide
Eidoskette. But when the Aristotle of the Prior Analytics is willing to
do that (for example, in B5 or B22), it is by way of a concession,
and certainly not by way of constructing an ideal case.
So we have two quite different notions of explanation— the me-
diating concept and the first-subject concept. The first arises naturally
out of Aristotle's syllogistic; the second makes its appearance, unfore-
shadowed, in the Posterior Aiialytics.
No doubt Aristotle's interest in the first-subject style of explanation
178 Illinois Classical Studies, XI
has something to do with his interest in eliminating competition
among putative causes of one and the same thing. To be sure,
Aristotle allows that one and the same thing might have several
different causes in several different senses of the word "cause"
("az/w"). They will seem to be competitors only to one who has failed
to note or take seriously the fact that "cause" is being used in different
senses. But if we stick with a single sense of "cause," Aristotle is
inclined to expect, or anyway to hope for, a unique cause.
We are thus meant to suppose that no attribute has more than one
first subject— that if G and H are distinct, it will not be both qua G
and qua H that A-things are A. By contrast, the mediating concept
of explanation guarantees non-uniqueness. If B is merely a species,
or subordinate genus, of A, there will be at least one other species
(or subordinate genus), B', such that being B' will be an equally good
way of being A. Thus if being a mallard is the cause of something's
being a duck, so will being a teal be the cause of something's being
a duck.
There is a related feature of the mediating concept of explanation
that makes it much less attractive than the first-subject concept. To
be a mallard is to be a duck of such-and-such a sort. The claim that
X is a duck because it is a mallard thus looks either trivial or false.
It looks trivial if we take "of such-and-such a sort" as so much extra
baggage. What we are left with is "x is a duck because x is a duck."
But the claim looks false if we suppose the differentia to be any part
of what makes something a duck. Being such-and-such a sort of duck,
one wants to say, is no part whatsoever of what it is that makes
something a duck.
It is worth emphasizing that simply requiring the major and middle
terms to be "reciprocals" would be insufficient to guarantee the kind
of explanation Aristotle is after in the Posterior Analytics. Since "All
and only triangles are 180° figures" is logically equivalent to "All
and only 180° figures are triangles," it would seem that being a 180°
figure is as much a cause of something's being a triangle as being a
triangle is the cause of something's being a 180° figure. But Aristotle
expects "is the cause of" to be asymmetrical; if B is the cause of A,
it will follow that A is not the cause of B. To use another of Aristotle's
examples, since all and only nearby heavenly bodies are non-twinklers,
it might seem that being a non-twinkler is as much a cause of being
nearby as being nearby is a cause of non-twinkling (78a30 ff.). This
seems clearly wrong to Aristotle and paradoxical, at least, to most of
the rest of us. It is, of course, a paradox familiar to anyone who has
tried to understand the notion of causation in terms of the idea of
necessary and sufficient conditions.
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Incidentally, it is one of the attractive features of the mediating
concept of explanation that it guarantees asymmetry by ruling out
commensurate universality. Being a mallard will be the cause of
something's being a duck, but obviously being a duck will not, of
itself, be the cause of anything's being a mallard. This sort of
consideration seems to underlie Aristotle's brief reversion to the
mediating concept at 99a30-99b3.
Pretty clearly Aristotle understands the "^wa" notion and the
"first-subject" idea in such a way that they guarantee asymmetry.
From "triangle is the first subject of 180° figure" it will follow that
180° figure is not the first subject of triangle. So recourse to the
mediating concept of explanation is not required to capture the
desired asymmetry. And the first-subject requirement, as we have
already noted, offers the additional promise of securing the uniqueness
of any adequate explanation.
The form of syllogism that an ideal Aristotelian explanation calls
for is thus Barbara-plus. But, contrary to what the Prior Analytics
would lead us to expect, the form is not Barbara plus the stipulation
that the minor, middle and major terms be nested in order of
increasing comprehension— far from it. We learn in the Posterior
Analytics that the form is Barbara plus the stipulation that the middle
term name the first subject of the attribute expressed by the major.
The ideal in science, according to Aristotle, is to discover, concerning
given attributes, qua what it is that things have them.^
University of Massachusetts, Amherst
^ An earlier draft of these comments was delivered in the symposium of the
American Philosophical Association, Western Division, at which Professor Hintikka
presented his paper. Those earlier comments had the benefit of a delightful discussion
with the late G. E. L. Owen. Whether that benefit accrues to these comments as
well, by a sort of nonlogical transitivity, I cannot judge.

